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ABSTRACT

...

Plea bargaining research has been bountiful in the last decade. One plea
bargaining setting that has escaped inquiry, however, is the military. This
study focuses on military plea bargaining by examining its many forms. Plea
bargaining occurs throughout the military court system's judicial and
nonjudicial components. The six levels within these components are compared.
Negotiated arrangements are reflections of the organizational structure,
restraints and role relationships developed at each of these levels. The
analysis suggests that the outcomes for similarly situated accused show
significant variance. Further, one type of judicial plea bargaining practice
should be a model for civilian courts while one form of nonjudicial plea
bargaining should be abolished as it is contrary to congressional intent.
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While disposing of law violators is a complex issue for any society, it
is even more problematic for one with diverse ideological norms and
commitments.

In a democracy, an important indicator of the quality of life

emerges in the way it responds to those charged with crimes.
has generated controversy is plea bargaining.

One measure that

This is an exchange process

involving an accused's admission of guilt to a criminal charge in return for
some consideration from the government.
sentencing questions are resolved.

Through its use, adjudication if not

More than eighty percent of all criminal

offenses are disposed of by means of plea bargains rather than combative trial
(Feeley, 1979a). Propriety questions have been raised over its use however
(Sudnow, 1965), and the National Advisory Commission (1973) has called for its
abolition.

Abolition, nevertheless, is exceedingly difficult to achieve.

The

prevailing decision mode in processing criminal cases is negotiation
(Springer, 1983), and those involved in adjudication learn early in their
careers to resolve disputes through informal means {Heumann, 1977).

Research

suggests that even those jurisdictions claiming to have eliminated or
restricted plea bargaining have merely terminated one method in favor of
another (Church, 1976; Cohen
1980).

&

Tonry, 1983; Farr, 1984; Rubinstein ietal~'

Some kind of plea bargaining operates in almost all jurisdictions.

Plea negotiation arrangements come in many packages.

They are put

together by various actors who are restrained by the organizational
environment in which they work (Eisenstein &Jacob, 1977).

Prosecutors and

judges, separately or in collaboration, mold agreements with defense counsel
and the accused.

The shaping of the arrangements as well as the recognition

that what is being done is plea bargaining reflect the legitimacy of the
practice in a jurisdiction.

One class of cases may be almost automatically

bargained out on a 11 take-it-or-leave-it basis".

Another set may involve
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intensive give and take. The deals put together may involve many or few
parts, obligating each party to perform more or less acts.

Besides an

admission of guilt, an accused may be required to testify in other cases or
otherwise cooperate in criminal investigations.

In turn, the government may

\__

be required to reduce charges or make a sentence recommendation.
would be expected to lessen punishments.

A judge

Finally, the fruits of their labor
11

may be recorded in writing and placed on the court record or concluded under
the table {Miller.et al., 1978).
11

Plea bargaining is not limited to criminal justice.

Other American

justice systems use it as well. While plea bargaining research in juvenile
justice has been ~nlightening (Ewing, 1978; Rubin, 1979), unfortunately,
discerning scholarship has not been extended to military justice.

In fact,

relatively little empirical research has been conducted on any facet of
military justice (Kourvetaris &Dobratz, 1977).

The paucity of research is

both surprising and a liability.
More than two million Americans are under military justice jurisdiction
(Department of Defense [DOD], 1983), a number larger than the populations of
- sixteen of our states {Bureau of the Census [BOC], 1983).

Further, more

service personnel are in the crime-prone risk group, 18-24 years, than 43
states (BOC, 1980; DOD, 1981). The system of military justice is a complex
decision network, developed to control violative acts in military society.
Its responsiveness to law violations has been great.

In 1983 alone, for

example, more than 400,000 dispositional actions were taken_by the system
against active duty personnel (see Annual Report, 1984).

And if the critics

of military justice are correct, our citizens in uniform are subject to a
second class system of justice (Sherrill, 1970).
This research examines military plea bargaining, a critical process which
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affects the entire military justice system.

It is the dominant safety valve

by which criminal cases are settled through nonadversary means.

The paper's

premise is that risks and uncertainties are managed at every level of middle
stage processing of military justice through some form of plea bargaining.

A

central problem for complex organizations is reduction of uncertainty
(Thompson, 1967). Military justice has features which impede monolithic
decision making, a characteristic which many observers inaccurately attribute
to military institutions generally {Janowitz, 1971).1 Plea bargaining is used
to lessen unpredictability in both the nonjudicial and judicial components of
military justice, enabling the system to function with greater stability.

The

forms that plea bargaining takes are descrfoed both within and across each
setting according to commonalities of process and outcome.
The paper is divided into three sections: l) bargaining in the military;
2) nonjudicial bargaining, and 3) judicial bargaining. The paper is f~rther
broken down by examining plea bargaining separately at each of the three
nonjudicial levels (nonpunitive measures, Article 15 proceedings, and summary
court-martials).

Judicial plea bargaining is viewed at all three judicial

forums {straight special, BCD special, and general court-martials) by
examining its overt and covert forms.

One of the nonjudicial· and both

judicial plea bargaining arrangements receive close attention •. The
nonjudicial form has been condemned by a congressionally sponsored
investigation.

The judicial arrangements have been monitored by mil1tary

appellate courts.

These appellate courts have recognized and regulated

explicit arrangements.
firestorm of criticisms.

Implicit bargaining, however, has generated a
Military plea bargaining, then, is an issue of

topicality and policy significance to the justice community.
Harris &Springer (1984: 245-246), in reviewing the difficulties
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associated with empirical research on plea bargaining., note the failure to
develop sufficient data sets.

They observe: "The processes of generating,

weighing, and adopting differing 'deals' typically are not documented." The
arrangements classified here not only reveal a great deal about military
justice, but by approaching a common justice problem, they al_ so help us to
more fully understand the variations in plea bargaining from one jurisdiction
to another, and the dimensions of plea bargaining in American society {Casper,
1979}.

Further, examination of what one legal control system is doing

provides the advantage of assessing similar applications in other justice
systems.

Study Method
The analysis is based on a variety of military documents, in-depth
interviews with military attorneys assigned to justice duties, and previous
studies.

Interviews were conducted initially in 1978 and then again in 1984.

The 1978 contacts involved daily interactions, both formal and informal,
sometimes for weeks at a time as part of a large field project on military
justice. Additionally, semi-structured interviews were conducted by telephone
in 1984 to foll ow up on changes in law and practice. . More than 60 mi 1i tary
justice (prosecutorial, defense, and judicial} agents were involved.

Much of

the research is grounded on procedures and practices found in the Army.
Nevertheless, because all services operate under one basic law, the Uniform
Code of Military Justice {UCMJ, 1950}, one set of procedural rules, the Manual
for Courts-Martial {MCM, 1969)2 and are accountable to one military supreme
court, the Court of Military Appeals (COMA), generalizations are not limited
to Army justice.

5

I. Bargaining in the Military
Plea bargaining may be conceptualized as -a two-party game.
has something of value to trade with the other side.

Each party

Unlike, the well known

"zero-sum game" where one side's loss is the other side's gain, plea
bargaining is a "positive-sum 11 variation where both parties work out a
solution which, it is argued, satisfies some of their interests.
benefits accrue to both sides (Harris &Springer, 1984).

Perceiv~d

Negotiating in the

armed forces follows this model •
.Commanders exercise prosecutorial discretion in the military.

Depending

on their· rank and duty status, these officers have a range of options
available to them under milita~y law to respond to a servicemember charged
with a crime •. They can decline to prosecute, initiate nonjudicial action, or
refer the case to a judicial forum.

Nonjudicial processing is distinguished

from a judicial one by 1) the-complexity of the proceeding; 2) the rules
governing decision making; 3) the legal training mandated for decision making;
and 4) the role functions of participants.

A commander's decision is

dependent on a weighing of such factors as: 1) the nation's status--war or
peace (Westermoreland

&

Prugh, 1980); 2) the military justice_ resources

available--time, money and personnel (English, 1977); 3) the goals to be
served--deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution;

and 4) the characteristics

of the case--offense seriousness, evidence strength and accused attributes
(Perry, 1977).
Whether a nonjudicial or judicial route is taken depends not only on the
decision by the commander.

The accused has the authority to block the

commander from using most significant nonjudicial actions, forcing the
commander to either take no action, or refer the case to a judicial body.

The
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nonjudicial selection decision is bilateral and open to negotiations. While
the accused's decision to negotiate a nonjudical outcome is greatly influenced
by military law, policies, and command practices, the final choice belongs to
the servicemember. The accused alone must decide the fate which awaits him or
her.

Command decisions to refer a case directly to a judicial body are

unilateral.

Unless the accused can convince the commander not to go the

judicial route, the ·accused has no control over the judicial selection
decision.

But once a case is in a judicial forum, the plea negotiation

decision rests ultimately with both the commander and the accused.

Bargaining

occurs, as a result, throughout the middle stages of military justice. The
product may be a formal plea bargain agreement scrutinized in a judicially
supervised court arena or its functional equivalent in an administrative
setting.
Workgroups carry out plea bargaining tasks. Judges, prosecutors and
defense attorneys are the primary actors in civilian negotiating workgroups.Eisenstein and Jacob (1977) suggest that stable workgroups yield greater
interaction and mutual dependence among workgroup members, reducing
uncertainty about knowing each member's norms and expectations.

Plea

bargaining is enhanced under conditions of familiarity among ~orkgroup
members. Military plea bargaining differs from this conceptualization of the
workgroup in that both accused in nonjudicial arenas and commanders in
nonjudicial as well as judicial settings play an active role.
1 egal ly

Further,

schooled defense counsel play a small part and trained judges are not

required to play any role in nonjudicial processing.

Lawyer-judges, defense

counsel, and government trial lawyers, however, work together in judicial
forums.

Commanders marginally interact with these other judicial members

though, relying on their prosecutorial staff to report on and work out the
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details of agreements. Two outcomes follow this organizational arrangement.
The judicial workgroup is larger and relatively stronger (more cohesive) than
the nonjudicial one.

Plea bargaining occurs less frequently in military

judicial proceedings than in many civilian court systems (Keveles, 1984).
Minimizing uncertainty of trial outcomes and processing costs are
concerns of all parties underpinning the use of plea bargaining in the
military.

An additional incentive, however, encourages command use of plea

bargaining: uncertainty over how their leadership is going to be evaluated.
Commanders are judged by the way they solve problems.

Solving problems

through nondirective counseling and cooperation is promoted over nonjudicial
processing, nonjudicial processing is preferred to judicial proceedings, and
nonadversary processing is more desirable than contested proceedings.

In

short, an effective leader is one who solves ·most personnel problems at the
lowest level and with the least conflict (Radine, 1977).

II. Nonjudicial Bargaining
Nonjudicial actions are disciplinary devices.

They are used by

commanders to correct or eject violators in a fairly quick and effective
manner.

Procedures tend to be flexible and relatively simple~

Defense,

prosecutorial, and judicial functions are performed by nonlawyers with one
officer sometimes performing all three roles. · Penal ties range from the
informal and mild to the formal and severe.

Because serious consequences may

result, an accused may refuse most types of nonjudicial processing and request
that the case be handled judicially.
Three nonjudicial alternatives are available to the military: 1)
nonpunitive measures; 2) Article 15 proceedings; and 3) summary
court-martials, the lowest trial court.

In the tightly knit military society,
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these administrative dispositional mechanisms are closely bound up with. the
judicial system, offering alternative ways to serve many of the same purposes
and outcomes of judicial processing and affecting intimately core military

.

justice practices.

At each of these levels a form of plea bargaining occurs,

some of which are virtually identical to the behavioral practices and
consequences underpinning negotiated guilty pleas in judicial forums.

Figure

1 identifies these three alternatives as well as the outcomes that will be
discussed below.
Inse~t Figure 1 about here
A functional equivalent to judicial plea bargaining minimally consists of
a process which is triggered only when there is a detected violation of
military law, requires the accused's consent for using it as a substitute to
judicial processing, and has judicial sanctions attached to it. The
government cannot impose the nonjudicial alternative over the accused's
objection.

Nonjudicial plea bargaining is an exchange process that avoids the

uncertainties of judicial processing.

A nonjuditial equivalent, however,

should ideally include an admission of guilt~ This· definition of plea
bargaining is inclusive.

It is not limited to guilty pleas.

As McDonald

(1979: 388) has argued, restricting plea bargaining to guilty pleas is
11

arbitrary, 11 and ignores other practices that do the same job as a guilty plea

bargain.

McDonald (1979: 385), as an alternative, suggests:
The concept of plea bargaining should not be restricited
to either pleas or bargains. The fundamental phenomenon
is the state's use of coercion to obtain the legal grounds
for imposing a penalty.

Civilian pl ea bargaining agents, prosecutors and defense attorneys, use the
tenn plea bargaining not only to refer to charge and sentence modifications in
return for a guilty plea. They also consider negotiations over charge
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dismissal and trial without an exchanged guilty plea to be plea bargaining.
Even pretrial diversion falls under the umbrella of plea bargaining,
especially when defendants are required to admit guilt informally before
charges are dropped {Feeley, 1979b; Feeley, 1979c; McDonald, 1979; Maynard,
1984).

In short, plea bargaining is the generic term for a range of

transactions often resulting in imposed punishments during the middle stages
of justice processing.

A. Nonpunitive measures: Administrative discharges
Nonpunitive measures simply refer to a class of administrative actions.
The term does not mean that the military is not sanctioning acts of
misbehavior.
1972).

Known, hannful consequences do fl ow from their use {Erwin,

Included under the title are such responses as extra training,

transfer in assignment, denial of privileges, criticisms {censure, admonition
or reprimand), and administrative elimination from service {Byrne, 1981). -The
most serious nonpunitive action by far is service termination.
An administrative discharge expeditiously processes out 11 unqualified 11
servicemembers.3

It is used frequently by military authorities.

Nearly

76,000 servicemembers were administratively eliminated for performing below
par in fiscal year 1979 alone.

This represents approximately 14 percent of

all those discharged from the services in that year {General Accounting Office
{GAO), 1980a).

From the military 1 s point of view, the nonpunitive discharge

is a useful substitute for a court-martial.

It is cost effective because it

avoids the court-martial requirements of burden of proof and procedural
protections.

The military escapes the difficulties that follow serious

trial--protracted statutory appellate processing, litigation, and possible
reversals. Manpower, time, and effort are conserved (English, 1977).

10
Concomitantly, such a separation imposes powerful economic and social
liabilities on servicemembers (Asher, 1979; Erwin, 1972).
Servicemembers are eliminated for adverse reasons.
11

11

The four most often

cited rationales are: 1) marginal performance; 2) unsuitability; 3)
misconduct; and 4) in lieu of court-martial (GAO, 1980a). The last one,
formally called discharge for the good of the service in lieu of trial,
11

11

comes the closest to being functionally equivalent to the behavioral practices
and consequences underpinning bargained guilty pleas at court-martials. This
discharge differs from other administrative ones in that the servicemember
must formally initiate the request for discharge.

It also focuses on those

charged with serious violations of military law who show little rehabilitative
value. More than 150,000 members of the armed forces received this form of
discharge over a ten year period (1967-1976).

The discharge has not been

expressly approved by the Congress nor is it rooted in military tradition.
Instead it is a modern invention of the armed forces to get rid of problem
servicemembers expeditiously.
The "good of the service" discharge is not simply a diversionary
mechanism from the adjudicatory process with the accused's consent.

Rather,

unlike diversionary schemes found in current civilian systems, the accused's
removal is from the society whose laws he violated, a practice comparable to
events in the past in which, for example, criminals were exiled to various
wilderness regions within the country or shipped abroad to survive in hostile
places.

Alternatively, a less severe analogy views the discharge as

equivalent to being fired from a job when the supervisor judges the employee's
work record as so undesirable as to render that person unworthy of retention.
Nevertheless, such a representation fails to account for the stigma attached
as well as the wide range of benefits lost.
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Every discharge is designated a label which further describes the nature
of the separation.

The discharge character assigned in about ninety percent

of the good of the service cases is "under other than honorable conditions,"
the most stigmatizing form of administrative discharge {Comptroller General of
the United States, 1978).4 This discharge character is considered a "badge of
infamy" which seriously interferes with employment opportunities and
eligibility for veterans' benefits.

Perhaps more importantly, the public

appears to equate this discharge character with a court-martial conviction and
punitive discharge, a discharge given exclusively by general or special
court-martials {English, 1977; Lance, 1978). Such a punishment is attached to
more serious offenses such as striking an officer, rape or robbery.

A

punitive discharge {dishonorable or bad conduct) is designed to disgrace, to
brand a servicemember as unworthy.

Yet because no court-martial has been

held, the servicemember with "bad papers" loses pretrial, trial and appellate
protections afforded to those processed through the courts (Effron, 1974;
Erwin, 1972; Lasseter and Thwing, 1982).
1. Chapter 10 Separations.
Differences do exist among the services in the requirements for using this
discharge in lieu of trial.

The discharge for enlisted persons in the Army is

under provisions of Chapter 10, Army Regulation 635-200 (Department of the
Army, 1973). Chapter 10 can be used only after four conditions are met:

1)

the accused is charged with an offense which is so serious that a
court-martial could adj-udge a punitive dischargeS; 2) the accused requests the
discharge; 3) the accused formally acknowledges his guilt of the charges; and
4) the commander authorized to grant Chapter 10 discharges approves the
el imi nation.

Command disapproval effectively returns the case to trial

{Hansen, 1976) •
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Should the government be willing to accept the request, military
authorities require the accused to sign a document, an application for
discharge, in which the accused acknowledges his guilt of the charges.
Typically, the specific request form signed by the accused contains the
following statement:
By submitting this request for discharge, I acknowledge
that I am guilty of the charge(s) against me or of (a)
lesser included offense(s) therein contained which also
authorize(s) the imposition of a bad conduct or
dishonorable discharge.
I have been advised and understand the possible effects of
an undesirable discharge and that, as a result of such
discharge, I will be deprived of many or all Army
benefits, that I may be ineligible for many or all
benefits administered by the Veterans Administration, and
that I may be deprived of my rights and benefits as a
veteran under both Federal and State law. I also
understand that I may expect to encounter substantial
prejudice in civilian life because of an undesirable
discharge.
The commander's decision to approve the discharge request almost always
terminates further court-martial action against the accused.
bypasses the judicial process.

The accused then

A request for discharge can be accepted

anytime, even prior to final action after trial (English, 1977). Commanders
convene and review all court-martial s. Without convening authority approval,
no court-martial's findings of guilt or sentence may be executed.

Since the

approving authority for Chapter 10s is often the same commander who convenes
and reviews serious court-martials, an accepted .Chapter 10 request can defeat
the court's decisions.

Nevertheless, the convening authority need not

disapprove court findings whenever he or she accepts the Chapter 10. The
judicial and administrative actions are considered separate and distinct
(Hansen, 1976).

Commanders are not generally receptive to letting the accused

"off the hook" through an administrative discharge after expending the time,
energy and money prosecuting and adjudicating him or her.

Most Chapter 10s

then occur prior to trial.6
2. Plea Bargaining
T~is discharge process and outcome is a consensual accommodation
practice, an essential element of plea bargaining.

Unlike most other forms of

administrative discharge, the individual has control over whether he or she
will receive this type of discharge.· While military authorities must wait for
the soldier to officially request the discharge, they can still informally
suggest to an accused that submission of a request would be received
favorably.

The admission of guilt, however, is not a court plea. The

discharge, therefore, lacks a core attribute of traditional plea bargaining
practices.

Nevertheless, the documented admission is certainly a "formal

response of a defendant to the charge,
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a central component of any plea

(Gilmore, 1973: 229).
Al though servi cemembers with a Chapter 10 secured prior to trial will not
be sentenced by a court, these soldiers elect to be sentenced
administratively. _Agreeing to the voluntary kick,a pretrial Ch~pter 10
11

1

accused avoid the potential federal conviction, confinement or punitive
discharge outcomes of a judicial proceeding.

Nevertheless, instead of facing

adverse findings of a court, accused automa~ically accept sue~ punishment as
an unfavorable discharge with the concomitant loss of veteran's benefits and
the increased possiblity of experiencing stigma in civilian life--especially
securing attractive employment opportunities. Military authorities, in turn,
get rid-of problem personnel, while avoiding court-martial and appellate
review or a hearing by a discharge board (Comptroller General of the United
States, 1978).
Military Justice agents were asked whether Chapter 10s were functionally
equivalent to court-martial plea bargaining. The respondents' reactions were
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mixed.

Some said yes, others said definitely no, and still others could not

make up their minds (Interviews, 1978). Hansen (1976:126) suggests that when
an accused submits a request for discharge, "He is in some respects engaging
in plea bargaining." This high ranking Army lawyer sees value in equating the
discharge to a plea of nolo contendere since the discharge procedure includes
no formal inquiry into the factual basis of the admission of guilt.

Hansen

conducted a 1972 survey of 39 general court-martial jurisdictions.

He sent

questionnaires to military prosecutors, staff judge advocates (SJAs), who are
advisors to commanders.

Few of his respondents, however, viewed Chapter 10 as

functionally equivalent to a court-martial plea bargain.
civilian researchers are unequivocal in their view.

In contrast,

Effron (1974: 293)

asserted that the administrative discharge process "provides an alternative
system of plea bargaining without the judicial supervision" required by
military law.

A report issued by the General Accounting Office

(GAO)(Comptroller General of the United States, 1978) argues that the
discharge is without doubt a form of plea bargaining.

The GAO found that plea

bargaining involves:
the exchange of a guilty plea for reduced charges or a
specifi~ maximum sentence. As used in this report, it
also includes exchanging an admission of guilt to an
offense punishable by a bad conduct or dishonorable
discharge imposed by a military court for the assurance
that the accused will not be brought to trial but instead
will be administratively discharged.
Chapter l0 s and other armed service equivalents were analyzed and then
1

attacked in the GAO report.

The GAO studied all cases in which the accused's

unit commanders recommended court-martial in 1976.
half were disposed of by plea bargaining.

It found that more than

Close to ninety percent of the plea

bargains, moreover, were discharges in lieu of trial.· The GAO asserted that
the majority of offenses which result in discharges in lieu of court-martial
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are unique to the military.

Yet those who choose the administrative route are

below age 20 and do not understand that the stigma of a bad discharge remains
for life.
The GAO also researched a group of servicemembers charged with a military
offense.7

It found that approximately half were court-martialled. The other

half received a discharge in lieu of court-martial.

Of those

court-martialled, slightly more than 60 percent received a punitive discharge.8 On the other hand, more than 90 percent of the administrative
discharges were under other than honorable conditions.

Court-martial decision

makers were less likely than discharge authority commanders to issue negative
discharges for the same offense.
treated differently.

In short, identically charged. accused were

The GAO suggested that were the administrative discharge

procedure nonexistent, three other alternatives, more favorable to the
accused, would be available:
1.
2.
3.

not trying the accused (insufficient evidence)
trying the accused at a court lacking punitive discharge
authority (summary or straight special); or
trying the accused at a court authorized to impose a
punitive discharge, but the court declines to adjudge that
punishment.

The GAO concluded by calling for the abolition of the adinini strative
dischrge procedure.

The GAO argued that its use is contrary to congressional
I

intent, and that its procedures lack the protections afforded accused by
court-martial.

Congress did not design a military justice system through the

Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) so that criminal offenses would be
disposed of outside of judicial processes. The UCMJ provides the safeguards
required to protect the rights of accused and the interests of society.

Under

the administrative discharge process, however, no neutral party evaluates the
wisdom of the discharge request nor determines whether the accused adequately
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comprehends the consequences of the discharge action. The GA0 1 s strong
assault on the discharge and the dearth of studies of a procedure which
affects thousands of Americans indicate that it is ripe for further empirical
examination.

B. Article 15 proceedings
A second administrative mechanism which has elements of court-martial
plea bargaining is Article 15, Commanding Officer's Nonjudicial Punishment
(UCMJ, Article 15).9 Like the Discharge for the Good of the Service, the
initial grounds for Article 15 action also is the alleged commission of a
crime under military law.

In contrast to the discharge though; the crime

allegedly committed is usually of a minor nature, an act similar to a
misdemeanor.10 S~rvicemembers, however, have received Article 15's for
allegedly committing serious offenses (U.S. v. Fretwell, 1960).
An Article 15 can be imposed upon any military person who is offered it
by a commander within an accused's chain of command and does not demand trial
by court-martial.

An accused has the statutory authority to refuse to accept

punishment under Article 15 and to choose instead trial by court-martial with
-

the attendant fifth and sixth amendment protections (Rivkin and Stichman,
1977; United States v. Booker, 1977) .11 An assertion of the right to trial by
court-martial tenninates an Article 15 proceeding.

The commander then must

decide whether or not to initiate court-martial proceedings against the
accused (DOA Regulation 27-10, 1980:3-12[2][d]).
At an Article 15 session, an accused has the right to present evidence in
defense, extenuation or mitigation.

The servicemember may also call witnesses

in defense, request the proceedings be open to the public, and have a person
represent his interest.

Nevertheless, because the Article 15 proceeding is
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characterized as nonadversary, the representative need not be an attorney, nor
may the accused or his or her agent question or cross examine witnesses except
if the commanding officer grants such a request., The representative acts
merely as a spokesperson for the accused raising issues before the commander
that will enhance the accused's findings and sentence {DOA Regulation 27-10,
1980:3-4).

If the commander is "convinced" that the accused committed the

offense, the commander then can impose punishment (DOA Regulation 27-10,
1979:E-4).
Depending on the grade of the commander and the accused, permissible
punishments include restriction, extra duties, correction custody,12
forfeiture or detention of pay, and reduction in grade.

For example, a fi.eld

grade commander can impose the following punishments Qn members in the third
enlisted grade {E-3} or below:
Admonition or reprimand and 60 days restriction or 45 days
extra duties or 30 days correction custody and forfeiture
of one-half of one month's_pay for two months or detention
of one-half of one month I s pay for three months and reduction of one or more grades {Department of the Army
Pamphlet 27-18, 1974b: 3-4).
Since an Article 15 accuser also has the authority to determine guilt and
to impose sentence, the Article 15 proceeding and outcome does not parallel
processes existing in civilian criminal justice, though similarities with
juvenile justice are evident (Keveles, 1985). A rationale for Article 15
proceedings is to provide commanders with "paternalistic" powers to correct
minor offenders without the necessity of using fonnal court processes (Note,
1973: 1491). Commanders explained this Article 15 policy objective in Senate
hearings by analogizing the proceeding to that of a father chastising an
erring subordinate: to "correct a youngster by taking him out to the woodshed"
without being forced to court-martial him (Bernard, 1976: 319,322).

Because

imposition of an Article 15 is not a court-martial conviction, it does not
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create a pennanent criminal conviction of record (Moyer, 1972; Note, 1973).
No prohibition exists, however, against making the record of Article 15
punishment a permanent part of a soldier's file (Army Times, 1977a, 1977b),
influencing the direction and duration of a military career.

Following the

paternalistic analogy then, by not allowing the servicemember to redeem
himself or herself, it is as if a father intends to hurt his son or daughter
permanently for his own good.
An Article 15 proceeding is by far the most frequently used procedure in
military justice. Twelve Article 15s were imposed for every court-martial
held in 1983 in the armed services (340,418 Article 15 vs. 29,887
court~martials, see Annual Report, 1984).

Article 15s popularity with

commanders is assured since it can be administered rather quickly and simply
at an informal hearing.13 Those commanders unhappy with its impact on a
servicemember are not prevented from resorting to court-martial.

Irnpos,tion

of an Article 15 for a serious offense does not bar a subsequent court-rnarti·al
for the same offense (UCMJ, Article 15(f); U.S. v. Fretwell, _19_60}.____ D_espite
the risk of exposure to a kind of double jeopardy, there ,_!_s_li_~tl_e c_hance that;
servicernembers would be receptive to exercising their right to trial with its
threat of potentially harsher punishments (Note, 1973).
1. Plea Bargaining
The Article 15 procedure is another vehicle of consensual accommodation
to military law violations, particularly in those cases in which the accused
does not dispute the allegations.

Discussions with military justice personnel

revealed, however, that most did not view an Article 15 as essentially like
plea bargaining.

They offered several reasons.

First it is not an admission

of guilt, but rather "merely accepting an allegation." Secondly, by waiving
the right to demand trial, the accused is just "consenting to the procedures."

---.. _

19

Thirdly, Article 15 acceptance does not necessarily lead to punishment.
Finally, unlike the discharge in lieu of trial which must be initiated by the
accused and responded to by the government, the Article 15 originates with the
state {Interviews, 1978).
Even though· the participants disagreed, the Article 15 route does
involve negotiation and carries guilt admission consequences.

What appears to

be an absence of negotiation still reflects a complex bargaining sequence in
many cases.14 Some servicemembers use the Article 15 session with the intent
of explaining themselves out of trouble.

If successful, their unit commanders

tear up the Article 15 or perhaps line out some of the charges. The accused's
failure to persuade, however, means that they either demand trial or agree to
accept punishment at this level {Interview, 1984; MCM, para. 132). Working
out a solution of the charge problem through Article 15 is advantageous to the
accused and the commander.

Referral of charges to a court-martial increases

the accused's risk of receiving the greater punishments found at
court-martial.

On the other hand, the court-martial system is not prepared to

handle hundreds of thousands of minor offenses.
,court-martial

Too many referrals to

may indicate that a commander cannot control his or her

personnel with leadership methods attuned to less severe responses (Radirie,
1977).
As to the guilty pl ea issue, the authors of a note in the Yale Law Journal
(1973: 1486) suggest that an Article 15 is analogous to a plea of nolo
contendere. They argued that the practical outcome of consenting to an
Article 15 is a waiver of the right to trial--the essence of a guilty plea,
11

11

invariably followed by punishment.15 Moreover, while the accused may not be
admitting guilt to an offense, an Article 15 punishment may be admissible at a
subsequent court-martial to aggravate punishment {MCM, para. 127c).

Its
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record at a court-martial is evidence of the commission of a previous
offense.16 An Article 15 punishment is treated as a prior conviction (U.S. v.
Johnson, 1970).

In other words, an accused at an Article 15 proceeding is

functionally pleading guilty to the commission of an offense for purposes of
increasing punishment at any later court-martial.
Article 15s have been used as a "secret" alternative to a court-martial
plea bargain arrangement.

Commanders have offered accused an Article 15 in

return fo.r some assistance from the accused.

Only occassi anally, when an

accused fails to get what he was promised, will concealed agreements be
exposed.

In one case, for example, an accused initially relied upon his

commander's promise to impose an Article 15 instead of court-martialing him in·
exchange for the accused's cooperation with an investigation.

The accused,

however, was in fact later court-martialled.17

C. Summary court~martials.
The third nonjudicial arena that uses plea bargaining is the summary
court-martial.

The summary accused, like an Article 15 accused, must agree to

being processed at this level.

Servicemembers who decline summary proceedings

may then face trial in a judicial setting, one which offers greater due
process protections.

But judicial courts also provide greater possible

punishments.
A sunmary court is considered an administrative proceeding.

The U.S.

Supreme Court has ruled that it is a disciplinary mechanism which is not an
adversary, punitive proceeding (Middendorf v. Henry, 1976). Because it is the
lowest trial forum, similar to a police court in civilian settings (Salisbury,
1982), its jurisdiction is limited.
servicemembers who are officers.

It cannot try any capital offense nor

Sanctions are also limited.

Punishments are
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restricted to confinement for 30 days, hard labor for 45 days, restriction for
two months, forfeiture of two-thirds pay for one month, or reduction to the
lowest grade.

Conviction at a summary court, however, can be used to

aggravate the sentence imposed at a higher court (MCM, para. 127c).
Summary procedures, in contrast to other court-martials, are simplified,
with fewer legal rules mandated.

A commissioned officer without formal legal

training presides (UCMJ , Art. 16). The 1 ay officer is required to p1 ay
judicial, prosecutorial and defense roles.

The accused lacks the statutory

right to the appointment of military counsel at a summary court, though
servicemembers may still retain a civilian attorney at their own expense.18
Defendants may, 'however, cross-examine witnesses, testify and present evidence
(MCM, para. 137).
summary court.

Direct appeal is only to the officer who convened the

The officer who convened the summary court may review,

suspend, or vacate the sentence (MCM, para. 88), and his superior may do the
same (MCM, para. 94).
Summary courts attempt to correct violating servicemembers through
punishment (Lennack, 1974).

As a mechanism designed to encourage

servicemembers' conformity to military standards, it is not unlike the goals
underpinning Article 15s. Approximately 40 percent of all cour:-t-martials in
the Army, Navy and Marine Corps are summary courts.19 Many critics have urged
its abolition (Lennack, 1974).

Commanders are said to use summary courts when

they have weak evidence and only are concerned with inmedi ate punishment
(Asher, 1979). The possiblity of command influence also is increased because
the person making the accusation can convene the court and choose the
presiding officer {MCM, para. Sc).

Its one officer court has been viewed as

making it a 'kangaroo court' (Radine, 1977: 188). Article 15 proceedings
should replace summary courts, some have argued,

since the punishments
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available at both levels are quite similar (Lermack, 1974).

Congress has

thought about its use for years, but has declined to eliminate it (Asher,
1979).
1. Plea Bargaining

Very little is known by civilians about plea bargaining at the summary
court.

The Department of the Army, for example, requires field commanders to

submit quarterly reports on summary cdurts, limited to such aggregate
statistics as the number of persons tried and convicted (Lermack, 1974).

From

annual reports from the four service branches, we know that the conviction
rate at the summary court is approximately 95 percent (Annual Report, 1984).
But we cannot discern the proportion of guilty pleas from these sources.
Lermack (1974), in the only empirical research in this area, examined 751
summary court-martials in 1969 at a single Army reservation in Maryland.
found that 88.2 percent of the summary accused pl_eaded guilty.

He

He attributed

the high rate to the relatively noncontroversial nature of the cases.

Only·

seven percent of all accused were charged with civilian type offenses, acts
punishable under state criminal codes. The overwhelming majority were accused
of purely military offenses, conduct unknown in civilian codes.

These were

offenses which were relatively easy to prove. For example, AWOL is an offense
in which the facts are typically not contested.
documentary evidence.

Proof is based primarily on

In the face of these circumstances, defendants have an

incentive to plead guilty and hope for lenient treatment from the court. The
Lermack analysis is similar to Mather's (1974) "dead-bang cases in which the
11

evidence is strong and the offense is not serious.
What Lermack does not discuss in connection with guilty pleas, however,
is the very important legal role of the commander after a court-martial.

As

mentioned earlier, commanders take final action on court~martial cases. They

··---

have the discretion to disapprove the' findings or sentence of the court.
Their disapproval authority of the sentence is limited to suspending or
reducing any punishment adjudged (UCMJ, Arts. 60, 64).

The accused then may

also hope or expect that the ~eviewing commander will also show sentencing
leniency.

Commanders, in fact, -regularly modified court sentences in

Lermack's sample.

But he argues that the inexperienced summary officer had a

tendency to impose the highest possible sentence, requiring the reviewing
commander to ameliorate the punishment. Lermack never deals with the
possiblity that these summary pleas may be based on an infonnal understanding
that guilty pleas will be rewarded.

Neither does he discuss weak evidence

His data analysis, limited to the presentation of frequency counts, is

cases.

of limited value.

Nevertheless, Lermack does provide the first systemati ~

glimpse of summary courts.
Despite the paucity of research, plea bargaining does occur at summary
courts.

From my own work on summary courts, pl ea bargaining appears to be· as

informal as the proceedings themselves.

By virtue of agreeing to a summary

court, servicemembers waive their right to a judicial determination of their
case.

Since most servicemembers do not ·contest the charges, the summary court

functions similarly to undisputed ~rticle 15 proceedings.

In_ fact, many of

those who turn down Article 15s in favor of pleading guilty at summary courts
are motivated by a belief that they would get a "better shake from summary
officers than their commanders" (Interview, 1984). Some servicemembers have
greater confidence in summary officers than their commanders.
One Army justice agent recently questioned about plea bargains at summary
courts suggested that because a prosecutor may not be present at trial, the
only way to directly affect the summary court outcome would be to reduce the
charges.

In return for a guilty plea, a commander would agree to lessen the
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number or the seriousness of the charges (Interview, 1984).

But the maximum

punishments attached to offenses either equal or exceed the available
punishments at the summary.

Other than characterizing the convicted offense,

. it would appear that charge reduction would have a minor effect.

Instead it\

would seem that the plea bargaining process is less visible and direct.
Most plea bargaining appears either as a result of agreements initially
made at a higher court level, or an implicit understanding between the accused
and the summary adjudicator or reviewing authority.

A case referred to a

higher court may be settled by a pretrial agreement, a instrumentality
addressed in the judicial plea bargaining section below. The parties would
agree to adjudication at the lower court in return for a guilty plea (English,
1977; Interviews, 1984).

Alternatively, a case initially referred to a

summary court would be disposed of through. implicit plea bargaining.

The

accused pleads guilty in an expectation, real or imagined, that the summary
\

officer or reviewing authority will show sentencing mercy.

III. Judicial Bargaining
Commanders may resort to a judicial forum when nonjudicial avenues are
considered inappropriate in particular cases.

Commanders have three choices.

They may refer cases to either of the two types of special courts or to the
general court-martial.

Methods of plea bargaining, however, do not appear to

be substantially different whichever judicial court is used.

Figure 2

identifies the alternatives as well as the outcomes that will be discussed
below.
Insert Figure 2 about here
Military judicial forums are entities formally independent of command
,,::;,,

control.

Legal professionalism permeates judicial courts, requiring legally

"'-.

trained servicemembers to play judicial,• prosecutorial and defense roles.
Both in goals and procedures, these mi_-litary_courts resemble criminal courts.
They are adversary in nature, follow strict rules of evidence, and offer
similar defenses to crime.- Military accused are provided with some of the
same rights that civilian defendants have.

For example, there are sixth

amendment equivalent rights to notice of charges (UCMJ,_ Art. 35)·,
confrontation of adverse witnesses (UCMJ, Art. 39), compulsory process for
obtaining favorable witnesses (UCMJ, Art._ 46), and assistance of defense
counsel (UCMJ, Art. 27).

Other rights, however, are withheld to

servicemembers,- such as right to indictment by grand jury (fifth amendment),
pretrial bail (UCMJ, Art. 9, 10, 13; Horner v. Resor, 1970), and trial by jury
(O'Callahan Yr Parker, 1969).

A. Special courts
A special courts-martial is an intermediate level court.

More civilian

--

type·crimes are processed here than at summary courts, offenses which would be
considered le_sser felonies-and-misdemeanors in civilian j_ustice systems
!(Kadish et al., 1980)_- Special courts process over 52 percent of all'
-court-martial s (Annual Report, 19H4r:~ These courts have the _authority to try
any case involving _noncapital: offens·es as well as, under certain
circumstances, capital offenses other than spying (UCMJ, Art. 19; MCM, para.
15). There are two types ·of special court-martials,

11

straight 11 specials and

bad conduct dis~harge specials (BCD Specials). A straight special is a lesser
- court than a BCD special. A straight special can impose confinement for not
more than six months, hard labor for not more than three months, restriction,
forfeiture of two-thirds pay for ~ot more than six months, and reduction to
the lowest enlisted grade (UCMJ, Art. 19) •. A BCD special can impose these
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same punishments, and, in addition, can punitively discharge an accused with a
bad conduct discharge (UCMJ, Art. 23).
Greater procedural requirementi are required at a BCD special than at a
straight special.
court members.
jurors.

At both specials, an accused may be tried by judge alone or

Court members have many duties that are the same as civilian

If servicemembers do not request trial by judge alone, they will be

automatically tried by court members.
proceed to trial by court members.

At least three members are required to

A BCD special must be presided over by a

trained military judge. The only exemption to this requirement is because of
11

physical conditions or military exigencies" (UCMJ, Art. 19).

In such cases,

the president of the court, who is the highest ranking member, presides.
Special courts, however, are rarely held without a military judge (Bishop,
1974).

Both a prosecutor and lawyer defense counsel are appointed to a BCD

special (UCMJ, Art. 27).

The BCD special accused has the same rights to a

qualified attorney as a GCM defendant. The straight special accused is
entitled to trained military counsel, however, unless such trained counsel is
unavailable.

Appointment of a military defense counsel who is an attorney is

provided Army accused unless certain documented emergencies exist (See
Lermack, 1974; UCMJ, Art 27c).

A formal record of the procee~ing, a complete

and verbatim transcript, must only be made in a BCD special (UCMJ, Art. 19).
Review of special courts are by the commanders who convened the court. A
service s Court of Military Review will automatically review cases in which a
1

bad conduct discharge is adjudged (UCMJ, Art. 67).

B. General Courts
A general court~martial (GCM) is the highest trial forum in military law.
Its jurisdiction extends to any person subject to the UCMJ for any offense

I

'i:

made punishable by the Code.

A GCM may impose any sanction not prohibited by

military law up to and including death:

Lesser punishments .include a

dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge or a dismissal for officer~.

Civilians

charged with committing war crimes also may be tried by GCM (UCMJ, Art.}8;
MCM, para. 14) •
The GCM offers the most procedural protections prior to and during the
trial.

Before the GCM can be convened certain steps,must be followed.

A

legal opinion as to the disposition of the charges must be given to the
convening authority.

The written advice is given by the staff judge advocate,

a convening authority's chief legal counsel (UCMJ, Art. 34).

Although seldom

done, a convening authority may take ac:_ti_9n contr~ry to the staff judge
advocate's recommendation :(Kadish et al., 1980). A pretrial hearing called an'
Article 32 investigation must also be held (UCMJ, Art. 32; MCM, para. 34). The objective of this hearing is to provide convening authorities with
nonbinding recommendations that will help them to decide how to dispose of--the
7

l'!

charges;{Kadish et al., 1980).

-

-

-

-

-- -

-

--

The Article 32 investiqation reviews the·
.

~

j

factual basis of the charges and determines whether probable -cause su-ppports
them.

This hearing has been traditionally compared to a grand jury proceed"ing

required under federal law and in some states (Moyer, 1972).29
- At the trial, a trained military judge,must preside and rule on questions
of trial procedure and admissibility:Of evidence.
be made.

A complete trial record must

The accused has a right to the appointment of trained military

defense counsel, to civilian counsel at their own expense, or military counsel
of their own selection if such counsel is reasonably available (UCMJ, Art.
38[b]).

A GCM tried by court members must consist of five or more members.

GCM conviction is reviewed by the convening authority and his legal officer.
A Court of Military Review will automatically review sentences involvin_g a

(-

A
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punitive discharge or confinement over one year {UCMJ, Art. 67).

C. Plea Bargaining
Both explicit and implicit plea bargains occur in judicial courts.
Explicit bargaining involves visible adversariness between the parties.
Resolution of cases is accomplished through direct compromises over the facts,
charges, and sentence.

Implicit bargaining focuses on regularized practices

in the courts that result in mitigation of punishment. Going rates are
established as a matter of course for classes of offenses without much, if
any, consideration for the particular characteristics of a case {Feeley,
1979c; Mather, 1979; Maynard, 1984).

Explicit bargaining in the military is a

formal arrangement between the accused and the commander, memorialized in a
written form, titled a pretrial agreement.

Implicit plea bargaining for the

most part centers on unregulated, standardized understandings between the
defense attorney and the judge. Military appellate courts ·have approved the
former and condemned the latter.
1. Overt plea bargaining.
Explicit plea bargaining begins with a formal offer by the accused and
defense counsel to negotiate a guilty plea with representatives of the
commander who referred the case to a court-martial {Gray, 1978). This
military commander not only has the power to convene a court-martial, but, as
indicated above, he or she reviews the sent~nte of the court. The convening
authority, then is also the reviewing authority.

The reviewing authority has

the power to disapprove the entire sentence by reducing it in quantity and/or
quality, suspend the execution of any part of or all the sentence by changing
the type of punishment as long as he does not increase the severity of the
sentence {UCMJ, Art. 64).

Because of this sentencing reduction power, the

-----
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accused bargains with the convening authority.
The contemplated arrangement may involve one or more concessions from
each party.

The accused, in addition to agreeing to plead guilty, may also be

asked to testify against other codefendants.

The convening authority, on the

other hand, may agree to any one or a combination of the following: 1) sending
the case to a lower court-'martial for adjudication; 2) approving only a
certain maximum sentence; 3) trying the accused only on certain charges and
specifications; 4) dismissing or withdrawing particular charges and
specifications; and 5) guaranteeing that the government trial counsel will not
object to the accused's pleading guilty to a lesser included offense {The
Advocate, March-April 1976; Bryne, 1981; U.S. v. Fleming, 1969).
Negotiations are usually administered by the representatives of the
accused and the convening authority.

The defense counsel usually meets with

the convening authority's legal advisor or staff.

Once the plea bargain

· arrangement is worked out, the agreement is reduced to a final written
document.

With the signatures of the principal parties (the accused and the

convening authority) and defense counsel, the document becomes a binding
contract and is fonnally the pretrial agreement.

The agreement becomes

enforceable once the judge accepts the accused's guilty plea.

Typically, in

return for an accused's guilty plea, the convening authority promises to
extend to the accused sentencing relief if the court sentence is more severe
than that agreed to in the contract.

If the court adjudges a less severe

sentence than the pretrial agreement, then the accused "beats the deal" and
the court sentence is implemented.

In a sense, the accused has "two bites of

the apple" {Interviews, 1978).
Pretrial agreements commonly consist of two parts. The first section is
the offer to plead gui 1 ty as well as a series of acknowledgements that the
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servicemember understands what he or she is doing througb_ consultation with
defense counsel and what must be done to insure that the agreement is kept.::::c-::
Although variations exist among and within the services, Army pretrial
agreements examined were found to often have fifteen different acknowledgement
provisions, many designed to protect the rights of the accused.

The section

also contains an agreement to enter into a stipulation of fact with the
go.vernment. Since there isn't any presentence investigation report in the
military to inform the court-martial sentencing authority, a stipulation may
become a paramount focal point in sentencing negotiations.

The stipulation

may be the only information the court has about the accused and the offense.
The second section, a much shorter document, describes the convening
authority's promises.
Pretrial agreements have been formally recognized and institutionalized
in the Army since 1953 (McMenamin, 1971), in the Navy since 1957 (Della Maria,
1971) and in the Air Force since 1975 (U.S. v. Avery, 1975).
quickly in the Army.

Its use grew ·

Less than 10 percent of all Army GCM offenders pleaded

guilty before the initiation of the Army~program.

By 1956, however, the rate

of guilty pleas for Army offenders jumped to about 60 percent (Everett, 1956).
This contractual bargaining has been closely monitored by military officials
and military appellate courts (See, for example, U.S. v. Care, 1969; U.S. v.
King, 1977). Over time, substantive and procedural problems found in such
agreements have been lessened (Gray, 1978; Vickery, 1972).
Military justice's ameliorative efforts stand in stark contrast to
civilian justice's more passive policing of plea agreements.
still remain in civilian plea bargaining.

Serious problems

Many are still products of verbal

understandings among the parties, yielding differing interpretations of
whether a specific promise was made and its meaning and effect (Jones, 1979).

-- --
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Others which are reduced to writing of~en 1ack specificity in detailing the
1

purpose an d consequences of the agreement.

To the extent that unambiguous,

comprehensive documents form the basis for mutual accommodation in the
military legal system, the guilty plea process is an open, formally
countenanced practice which protects the accused's due process rights.

Rosett

and Cressey (1976: 172) suggest that formalizing plea bargaining by written
agreements "attempt to reduce the welshing and potential corruption that
accompany secret negotiations." To be sure, as Rosett and Cressey point out,
such a procedural device is not a panacea for all the discretionary decision
making issues that can be raised about plea bargaining.

The nonjudicial

alternatives available in the military make this clear.

But it does respond,

sometimes very effectively, to one 1 critical problem.

Ironically, military

_justice which has suffered from a terrible reputation may have something of
value to offer civilian criminal justice.
Empirical research on pretrial agreements is almost nonexistent.

From·

figures supplied in the Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics (Flanagan &
McLeod, 1983: 493-498), calculations were performed which showed that 71.9
percent of all general and BCD special court-martial s in the Army, Navy and
Marine Corps resulted in guilty pleas in fiscal year 1979.
pleas represent 63.7 percent of all guilty pleas.

Negotiated guilty

Reliance on guilty pleas

and plea bargaining are cer_tainly ..!!.~t as gr~at __ in :the military_ as it is in the
civilian sector !(Miller et al., 1978).

Nevertheless, great variation exists;

-

-

-

--

within the services and between court-martial levels (See Table 1).

For

\

example, there were fewer guilty pleas at the higher court than the lower one
across the services, a finding which is understandable given the potential for
a much rnore severe punishment at the GCM level.

The Army was much more

willing to negotiate than the Navy: 92.1 percent of all GCM guilty pleas and

··---
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76.3 percent of all BCD special guilty pleas in the Army were negotiated.
Navy percentages for negotiated guilty pleas were 72.7 and 45.2 respectively.
Insert Table 1 about here
These differences represent the discretion given to each service branch to
mold its own plea·bargaining policy.

For example, in my own contacts with Air

Force personnel {Interviews, 1978), they indicated that their low guilty plea
rate was related to prohibitions on negotiations mandated by Air Force.
policymakers.

The highest authorities in the Air Force justfce system must

approve the use of the pretrial agreement route ina case. Approval is only
granted in unusual circumstances {national security, child victim cases).
Nevertheless, other service branches believe that without its regular use
military justice would be faced with a crisis, particularly involving a heavy
backlog of cases {Gray, 1978).
The few studies that have been done in this area have been limited in
scope to analysis of variables, often missing contextual aspects of decision
making (Maynard, 1982}.

Call, England and Talarico {1983) looked at the

effects of eliminating plea bargaining at special courts in the Coast Guard
and found, using time series analysis, that its abolition did not make much of
a statistical difference to its justice system.

Their research, however, is

problematic given the small number of cases and unique characteristics of the
Coast Guard, an arm of the Department of Transportation.

Keveles {1984)

examined plea bargaining at general and BCD special courts in the Army and
demonstrated, using discriminant function analysis, that number of charges had
the most discriminating power.
cases in Europe.

His research, however, was limited to Army

Only Pitkin {1977), a Naval lawyer, questioned participants

about plea bargaining.
military offenders.

Nevertheless, his participants were incarcerated
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2. Covert plea bargaining.

As Table 1 made clear, not all guilty pleas are the result of
negotiations.

A number of possible reasons may help to explain servicemember

guilty pleas without the protections offered by a pretrial agreement. Lermack
(1974), in addition to studying summary courts, also examined straight

specials.

He found in his sample of 2,637 that 97 percent of the accused were

charged with military crimes only.
guilty to all charges.

Nearly 94 percent of the accused pleaded

His interpretation, limited to these summary

statistics, is almost identical to that offered for summary court: in the
majority of cases involving purely military offenses, the facts are not in
dispute.

Consequently, there is little reason for contesting the case.

Other

cases that result in guilty pleas at straight specials, Lermack asserts, are
probably due to the commander or his agents offering the accused trial by
straight special as an alternative to trial by general court-martial in return
for a guilty plea.

Lennack's failure to ·even mention pretrial agreements, -

however, may indicate that the cooperative arrangement is informal.

On the

other hand, Lennack found that 47 percent of all general court-martials at his
sample site disposed of civilian type offenses.

He suggests that civilian

type offenses involve complex factual situations which explains the lower rate
of guilty pleas in general courts.
nonnegotiated guilty plea cases.

His interpretations explain some
But they don 1 t·even begin to explain plea

bargaining.
I conducted field research on Army general and BCD special courts during
the late seventies, and found accused pleading guilty without an agreement in
several jurisdictions. Finding this puzzling, court-martial participants were
questioned.

It was discovered that there were informal agreements between the

defense counsel and military judges.

Some judges were much more predisposed

-----
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toward those who pleaded guilty without a pretrial agreement, making their
views known by their sentencing decisions and informal interactions with
defense counsel.

These judges re~ularly rewarded nonnegotiated accused with

sentence leniency.
The judges reasoned, according to these informants, that straight guilty
pleas would help them manage their caseload better.

Straight guilty pleas

require less judicial work and time than do negotiated guilty pleas during the
providency inquiry, the judges• questioning of the accuseds 1 understanding of
the meaning and effect of the guilty plea and pretrial agreement.

By

regulatfon (DOA, 1969) and military appellate court decision (U.S. v. Care,
1969), a judge's providency inquiry had to stand up to elaborate "boiler
plate 11 (checklist) standards of interrogation when a servicemember pleaded
guilty pursuant to an agreement.

Trial judges were required by the Court of

Military Appeals (COMA), the supreme court of military justice, to play an
aggressive role in policing the use of pretrial agreements by making the judge
responsible for fully exposing the terms of the agreement in court. Judges
were also required to show on the record that they secured from the defense
counsel as well as the prosecutor positive confirmation that the written
agreement 11 encompasses all the understandings of the parties and that the
judge's interpretation of the agreement comports with their understanding of
the meaning and effect of the plea bargain 11 (U.S. v. Elmore, 1976: 81; U.S. v.
Green, 1976; U.S. v. King, 1~77).
The necessity of making the trial judge responsible for a line by line
investigation of almost every facet and consequence of pleading guilty
resulted in a perception that the acceptance of a negotiated guilty plea was
taking as much time as trying a contested case.

In the typical words of one

military justice decision maker who literally threw up his hands:
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COMA ( the military supreme court) is insane. It has
gotten to the point where everyone but the accused is
responsible for his actions. The defense, counsel must
make sure that the accused is protected, the judge must
make sure that the defense counsel protects the client,
and the government trial counsel is responsible for
insuring that the judge makes sure that the language he
uses with regard to defense counsel 1 s understanding of his
client 1 s wishes is correct (Interview, 1978).
The escape hatch was the less regulated nonnegotiated guilty plea. The
providency inquiry would be expedited by encouraging accused to offer straight
guilty pleas.

A 11 gentlemen 1 s understanding 11 developed among the parties.

Standardized sentences emerged for those who entered a straight guilty plea.
Prosecutorial and defense counsel suggested that even bringing fairly serious
cases to a GCM judge would generally result in no more than a bad conduct
discharge and nine months confinement.
Rarely in research does a situation present itself which confirms an
infonnal, almost invisible process known only to the principal agents
involved.

While in the field, however, this pattern of judge centered plea-·

bargaining became public, adversity developed, and a scandal was born.

A

military defense counsel, unaware of one of these judge 1 s sentencing
predilections, pleaded his client guilty with a pretrial agreement.

The

accused received what the defense counsel believed to be an unacceptably high
punishment.

According to third parties, the defense counsel then quizzed the

judge privately about the sentence.

The judge allegedly expressed surprise

that the defense counsel lacked understanding of sentencing practices in his
courtroom and suggested that he act differently in the future.

The defense

counsel 1 s reaction was to 11 blow the whistle 11 on the judge 1 s behavior by
appealing the case and its sentencing outcome to military appellate courts
(U.S. v. Caruth, 1979; U.S. v. Newburn, 1977; U.S. v. Jenkins, 1977; U.S. v.
Gonzales, 1977). Although subsequently COMA did not find in favor of the

36

accused nor affirm the allegations of impropr.iety, it did chastise the judge
for creating the appearance of an implicit arrang~ment and improper sentencing
policy (U.S. v Caruth, 1979). The judge, a full bird colonel, later resigned
his commission and retired.

It is not known what happened to the whistle

blowing defense counsel.
After my field research, COMA decisions c.onti nued to monitor guilty pleas
pursuant to agreements, reaffirming specific guidelines for military judges to
follow (U.S .• v. Crowley, 1978; U.S. v. Hendon, 1979). Trial judges, in turn,
continued to respond to pretrial agreement cases by ritualisticlY adhering to
a mechanistic application of rules, padding the record and hindering judicial
efficiency and economy {Lause, 1979; U.S. v. Kraffa, 1980). A judicial
perception that they had to run a 11 guil ty pl ea I gauntlet' 11 was fostered
(Moriarty, 1981). Despite some relaxation of a hypertechnical enforcement of
the plea inquiry requirements by COMA,21 judges in the 1980s still have to
exercise inordinate care and sensitivity in negotiated guilty plea cases. ·
Canned answers to rote questions have not been eliminated (Moriarty, 1981).
Recent telephone discussions with military justice officials indicate
that judges_rema_in_fo.rmc3..li~ti~-a11cl.~~!!1:ious; 1n n~.gotiated guilty pleas.cases;_
(Interviews, 1984).

But they still continue to accept nonnegotiated guilty

pleas, seemingly imposing punishments reflective ~f the value of such pleas
(Gray, 1981).

As one high ranking Army administrator stated:

As a rule of thumb, a judge will knock off one or two
months from a BCD special while in a GCM, the amount of
slack cut is less clear (Interview, 1984).
An Anny GCM judge, however, offered no such assurances.

Well aware of the

judge who got. into appellate trouble, this judge said:
what happened with him is in the past. He was involved in
docketing sequence ••• plea guilty at arrangement session
which isn't used too much now. I've seen guilty pleas
with or without a pretrial agreement in AWOL
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offenses •••• Just need three slips of paper. A plea of
guilty with or without a pretrial agreement is the same
thing, no difference if made early or finally, I don't
consider that. But as a practical matter, I give more of
a break for guilty pleas because it shows he did it,
contrition, sorry and grown up. But judicial economy,__ !
don I t play that game. Three gui 1ty pl ea or cont.ested
cases, I follow a take it as you come--credo. _Otb_erwise,
as my grandmother said, 'you're pissing uo~wjJJd.- -we ~received straight forward .pronouncements from TJAG [The
Judge Advocate General of the Army,-- the--chi ef Army justicecommander] about that judge. Don't have any great ideas
(Interview, 1984).
1

-

'
Like others recently
questioned, this judge understood the message from higher

ups to avoid using creative means to expedite cases.
too high.

The career costs were

He intended to do nothing out of the ordinary.

any predetennined notions about the cases before him.

He wouldn't have

Yet the judge did

indicate that guilty plea defendants will receive a break, though he offered
no differentiation between straight guilty pleaders and negotiated ones~
A third Army administrator suggested that straight guilty pleas are
unusual and judges "know no bottom line"

in sentencing.

Straight gµilty

pleas that do occur, however, are the result of government refusals to
negotiate.

Commanders would not deal in some military cases because it would

be easier and faster to prove the case at trial than to successfully take the
case through provi dency.

"The accused throws himself on the !l'ercy of the

court in such cases (Interview, 1984).
11

Another Army judge added that the

defense counsel makes sure the judge knows there is no pretrial agreement,
hoping to get a favorable sentencing outcome (Interview, 1984). A Navy
administrator disclosed a slightly different view: there is an "expectation
without articulation" by the parties that sentencing leniency will follow
straight guilty pleas.

"Maverick judges" are treated to defense tactics which

impede -their efficient management of cases:
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No one talks about it. There is a premium on judges being
consistent punishers. Otherwise defense counsel will
request trial by members [jurors] which slows the process
down by a factor of five (Interview, 1984).
"
Unless one is in the field, constantly observing and interacting with the

military- legal community, one really doesn't know the degree to which judge
centered plea bargaining has changed.

Telephone discussions don't promote

candid responses, especially in the absence of a previous familiar
relationship.

One interviewee suggested that judges don't know if their

remarks will be personally attributed to them.

Disclosure concerns, a

perennial problem in most organizations, is particularly acute.in military
settings.

What is known, however, is that allegations of covert plea

bargaining still reach the appellate courts.

Unwritten agreements that are

not brought out at trial appear to happen even in pretrial agreement cases
(See

u.s~

v. Cooke, 1981; U.S. v. Joseph, 1981).

It is not unreasonable to

suspect, in light of these circumstances, that implicit plea bargaining
continues, perhaps, with some variation in form.

Conclusion
Discretion in the administration of justice is a fixed quantity.

It

cannot be removed, only moved around (Alschuler, 1978;. Morris- & Hawkins,
1977).

Discretionary exchange processes permeate justice systems.

The

fulcrum of juvenile justice, for example, consists not only of juvenile courts
but an earlier intake (nonjudicial) stage as well.22 Efforts are typically
made by the parties involved to work out agreements at the nonjudicial level.
Juveniles are required to make an admission of guilt and agree to the
disposition proposed by intake officers.
judicial hearing.

Those who refuse may ask for a

The juvenile court route, however, involves a greater risk

of a more severe disposition.23

Intake officers, on the other hand, may urge
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:)·

acceptance of nonjudicial intervention as a way to reduce judicial caseloads
or because of their un_certainty that there is sufficient evidence to sustain
. delirJquen.cy cgmp_lai~ts at judJcial proceedings (Krisberg
.

---

---

'Pettibone et al., 1981).

&.

Aust.in, 1978;
--

In fJier·middle stages of juvenile justice processing

then, - bargai n(ng practices. ~<>1 ve the prob 1em of disposing of many cases.
-Much has_ been said a_bout Alaska I s successful ban on pl
ea bargaining
·-

1

-

-

'

.,-::

-

-

\(Rubinstein et al., 1980).

But ai later scholars have suggested, the Alaskan;

research most likely overestimated the effects of-the abolition fSee Casper &
Brereton, 1984; Cohen

&

Tonry, 1983).

Call, England

&

Talarico (1983) found

that the abolition of plea bargaining in the Coast Guard did not make much of
a difference to that small justice system.

Nevertheless, the focus of their

study was special court-martial pretrial agreements.· Keveles (1984: 408-409)
also limited his analysis of Army plea bargaining to general and BCD special
court-martials.

He concluded that the relatively low rate of guilty pleas and

negotiated agreements means that the military is "an institution of tri.als-/!
Both military studies' restric_tive context, however, predetermined the
possible interpretations drawn.

Feeley (1979b: 200} has remarked:

If plea bargaining is the generic -term for negotiation in
the criminal process, then we need a richer vocabulary for
generating typologies and exploring in greater detail the
process of nontrial.
Plea bargaining in the military takes many forms.
nonjudi~ial or the judicial level.

They may occur at the

We have seen that at the nonjudicial level

plea bargaining involves agreements in which the accused has considerable
control.

An accused who consents to nonjudicial processing is also agreeing

to punishment.

We have also found that.the accused's agreement is minimally

equivale.nt· to a nolo contendere plea. Chapter 10 servicemembers, however, are
required to make an admission of guilt and summary accused must plead guilty.
Many of the procedures and penal i ti es at the nonjudicial 1evel are as informal
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as those existing in juvenile justice, particularly at the intake stage.

To

protect against the abuse of discretion, the sanctions that many be imposed
are strictly limited, and servicemembers, just as juveniles, are given the
right to opt ou~ of the nonjudicial processing and demand judicial referral
under most circunnstances.
Judicial plea bargaining is a more familiar process.

Unlike many

civilian jurisdictions, negotiated guilty pleas are a result of fonnal, legal
contracts.

The relatively high percentage of nonnegotiated guilty pleas is,

in part, tied to implicit plea bargaining practices.

Two kinds of covert plea·

bargaining have been identified: the accused and their defense counsel having
an understanding with 1) the commander to process the case at a lower
court-martial, lowering the ceiling on the potential sentence, or 2) the judge
to limit his or her punishment.

Processing an accused through a nonjudicial

route, especially an administrative discharge, does not appear to be in the
interest of the charged servicemember. Disposing of a case through a pretrial
agreement works toward insuring that the rights of the servicemember are
protected.
Finally, this analysis challenges the recent picture of crime in the
anned forces.

The military has claimed that its crime problein is diminishing.

Military authorities base their conclusion on the lowering of the rate of
court-martials.

They argue that a better breed of recruits has entered the

service (Interviews, 1984). The image, however, is suspect given the evidence
of multilayered responses available outside of judicial processing.
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NOTES
1 The military is frequently viewed as the paradigm of bureaucratic
organization with an emphasis on centralized decision-making and hierarchy
(Kourvetaris &Dobratz, 1977). Yet that perspective has beerr strenuously
cha 11 enged by Mi ewa l d (1970). Another approach is to cons fder the military
organization as an open-system. It is dependent on and continuously interacts
with its many parts and environment (Segal et al., 1974) •.. Decision making
_reflects an·attempt to deal with the uncertainties inherent in open systems.
· 2 The.Military Justice Act of 1983 (Public-Law 98-209--December 6, 1983)
amended the UCMJ~ Subsequently, the President modified the MCM (Executive
Order 12473) effective August 1, 1984. The changes, however, do not
materially affect the issues discussed in this paper.
3 The military has long had the authority to eliminate servicemembers judged
unqualified for retention, irrespective of whether·the failure to measure up
involves acts subject to trial by court-martial (Comptroller General of the
·
·
United States, 1980; Erwin, 1972).
4 There are three types of administr~tive dtsch_arge-s: honorable, ,general,
·- · and under :other .than honorable· c·onMtions. ·The under other than- flohorab 1e}:> ,~.
:dfsc,harge' character·\'.ias'_formerli-termed' un'desirable. Although the label~-Y,c
has changed, the negative results are the same.
_____ 5 The preferred charge.need not have already been referred to a
court-martial that can impose a punitive discharge; it is sufficient that the
charge is serious enough that if found guilty at an appropriate court-martial,
the soldier's punishment could include a discharge (Hansen, 1976).
6 A post-trial Chapter 10 discharge does have attractive features for the
military under certain circumstances. A court punishment that does not
include a punitive discharge and a substantial period of confinement will
trigger its more ready use at that late stage. Commanders have even been
urged to disapprove an adjudged punitive.discharge and accept a request for
discharge for the good of the service in those cases where substantial
incarceration has not been adjudged. Military authorities consider such a
response to be an indicator of sensible management. Every case involving an
approved punitive discharge or confinement of one year or more requires
appellate review before a conviction becomes final. Review typically takes
two or more years. Administrative discharge action, however, may only take a
few weeks. Delays and expenses are minimized, conservation goals stressed by
. the highest military leaders (English, 1977).
,

,

11

7

11

The GAO reported on its research of a randomly selected group (n = 1,094)
of servicemembers charged with absence without leave for over 30 days, an
offense punishable by a dishonorable discharge and up to one year's
incarceration.
8 · Every one of these punitive discharge cases was a bad conduct discharge
rather than the more severe dishonorable discharge.
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9 In the Navy and Coast Guard, nonjudicial punishment is called 11 Captain 1 s
Mast, 11 in t)1e Marine Corps, 11 0ffice Hours, 11 and in the Army and Air Force,
11
Article 15. 11 The discussion below will refer to nonjudicial punishment by
its Army and Air Force name.
lO The term 11 minor 11 generally means an offense for which an individual can
receive a maximum punishment of confinement for one year or less and does not
include a dishonorable discharge (Department of the Army [DOA] Pamphlet,
1974:3-1; MCM, para. 128b).
11 Servicemembers attached to or embarked in a vessel, however, may not refuse
an Artic;:le 15 (DOA Regulation 27-10, 1980: 3-11).
12 Correctional custody is physicial restraint which has been compared to
being in jail. See Rivkin and Stichman, 1977.
13 Servicemembers have a right to appeal their.Article 15 punishments. The
appeal, however, is limited to the next superior commander in the chain of
command (UCMJ, Art. 15[e]). Few servicemembers exercise their limited appeal
right. Some believe that it would be a waste of time. Others fear that
commanders would retaliate (Radine, 1977).
·
14 Maynard (1984) suggests that a typical view of pl ea bargaining is that
cases that are strong but not serious are handled routinely, without really
negotiating:
The trouble with this characterization is that it makes
the negotiation process appear to be more automatic and
less contingent than it actually is. • •• Yet the lesson
from foregoing analysis is that a bargaining opener can be
initiated in different ways and, once produced, can be
handled through diverse responses and replies, so that a
routine outcome of final decision still reflects strategic
and systematic negotiation
efforts (104) •••• In
conclusion, the 11 routinen~ss" of a case does not mean
there is an absence of negotiation, but only that it is
conducted so as to focus on what should be done and-focus
off why it should be done anahow prosecution and defense
view---:rffe case (107).
15 The Yale authors relied on a principle enunciated in the U.S. Supr~me Court
while most pleas of
decision of North Carolina v. Alford, (1970:25)
guilty consist of both a waiver of trial and an express admission of guilt,
the latter element is not a constitutional requisite.'
16 An Article 15 is evidence of the commission of a previous offense only when·
the accused, prior to the Article 15 acceptance, was formally notified of his
or her right to confer with independent counsel about waiver of trial (U.S. v.
Booker, 1977). A record of an uncounseled Article 15 is inadmissible at
sentencing.
17 The accused was referred to a court-martial in which he entered into a
formal plea bargain agreement. The servicemember, however, failed to raise
the claim of immunity at trial _when the judge asked whether the written plea
1

•••
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bargain agreement encompassed all the understandings of the parties. On
appeal, the military appellate court refused to consider the post-trial
assertion of an alleged Article 15 agreement since it contradicted the
accused's representations at trial (U.S. v. Joseph, 1981). _
18 Defendants without counsel, howeve~, cannot have the conviction used later
at a higher court to impose a punitive discharge unless they knowingly waive
counsel (UCMJ, Art._27, 38[b]; MCM, para. 79d; Middendorf v. Henry, 1976; U.S.
v. Booker, 1978).
-19 Summary courts, however, represent less than two percent of all Air Force
court-martials. See Annual Report, 1984.
20 Article 32 investigations and grand jury proceedings are both used to
determine whether a person is brought to trial. Nevertheless, unlike a grand
jury which consists of from 12 to 23 members, an Article 32 is composed of one
commissioned officer. The Article 32 investigating officer (IO) is selected
by the convening authority (MCM, para. 34a). Also, both federal and state
grand jury proceedings are carefully kept secret, and the accused and his
defense counsel are excluded (Moyer, 1970). In contrast, Article 32
proceedings are generally open, defendants are present~ and defendants have a
right to representation by appointed military lawyer counsel or, if they
prefer, by hired civilian counsel. Although from the defendants' perspective,
Article 32 investigations may be favorably compared to a grand jury, in
reality, it is very much like a preliminary hearing which has one judge and
which the accused attends and participates. An important difference, however,
is that decisions by a grand jury or preliminary hearing judge are binding on
a prosecutor while they are not in the military. The IO may only recommenci __
action for or against referral to trial to the convening authority. The
convening authority may disregard without comment the IO recommendation (MCM,
para. 35). An Article 32 then cannot be an effective screening device.
21 Recent case law no longer requires a total commitment to conclusively
demonstrating on the record an itemized discussion of the exact terms of
agreements. See U.S. v. Crouch, 1981; U.S. v. Akin, 1980; U.S. v. Crawford,
1981; U.S. v. Griego, 1981; U.S. v. Hinton, 1981; U.S. v. Hunt, 1981]
22 Intake is the first stage in juvenile court processing. It is an
administrative screening device which disposes of cases either informally,
without court intervention, or by referral to a judge.
23 Intake probation officers are granted discretionary powers by juvenile
court judges. Intake officers may dismiss complaints against children. Cases
may be al so adjusted nonjudi ci ally through unofficial hearings without formal
charges being fi 1ed. Nonjudicial responses include admoni ti ans, informal
probation, and referral to diversionary program. Final nonjudicial actions
usually require the voluntary consent of the children and their parents, and
the approval of judges. But juveniles handled informally are still vulnerable
to court processing later on. Those who do not cooperate with the intake
officers' efforts, by denying the complaints or treatment pr-.opo_sed, may ask _
for a formal hearing. Nevertheless, children choosing the judicial route risk
an incarceration disposition (Krisberg & Austin, 1978;:Pettibone et al., 1981).
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Figure 2
Command Judicial Alternatives and Outcomes
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Tab.le 1
Guitly Pleas in the Armed Forces During Fiscal Year 1979a
(Percent)
GCMs
Gu il ty P1eas Gui 1ty P1ea ·
Percentaged
Negotiated

BCDs
Guilty Pleas Guilty Plea
Percentaged
Negotiated

SERVICE
70.5
(465)

76.3
(355)

87.9
(1,036)

45.2
(468)

Army
(1,108)a
(660)b

51.6
(572)

92~1
( 526) .

Navy
(134)b

·65 .7
(88)

72.7
(64)

65.2
(103)

84.5
- (87)

82.7
(482)

34.2
(69)

d

49.ae
(514)e

(1,033)C

Marine Corps
(158)b
(583)C

Air Force
(202)b .
(1033)C

51.5
(248)
d

a Table based on data provided in the 1982 Sourcebook of Criminal Justjce
Statistics
b Total number of GCMs
~ Total number of BCD specials
Data unavailable
e Both straight and BCD specials

